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Abstract— Tactical wireless sensor networks (WSN) consist of 
power constrained devices spread throughout a region of interest 
to provide data extraction in real time. The main challenges to 
the deployment of tactical WSNs for mission-centric operations 
are limited nodal energy and information security. In this paper 
we develop security mechanisms to be implemented on a tactical 
WSN using the 6LoWPAN protocol for use by the United States 
Marine Corps (USMC). Specifically, we develop an architectural 
framework for tactical WSNs by studying security gaps and 
vulnerabilities within the 6LoWPAN security sublayer which is 
based on IEEE 802.15.4. We develop a key management scheme 
that is non-broadcast but that is also feasible in an operational 
scenario. In addition, we modify the 6LoWPAN packet structure 
to facilitate the newly developed keying mechanism. The tactical 
WSN architecture is designed to defend against a variety of 
network attacks that can potentially occur. Simulations will be 
conducted via MATLAB to show the effectiveness of the 
developed keying and communication mechanisms.  
I.INTRODUCTION 
A wireless sensor network (WSN) is a group of sensor 
nodes geographically distributed to provide data gathering and 
monitoring of tasks and events. WSNs are finding increased 
applicability to the Department of Defense (DoD) in areas 
specific to tactical surveillance and reconnaissance. A WSN 
can be used to remotely monitor a battlespace, making the 
presence of a warfighter unnecessary thereby increasing the 
safety to forces and decreasing the cost of an operation. In 
addition, a WSN can be used to remotely monitor deployed 
systems and trigger alerts at a command and control site when 
certain events occur.  
The WSN devices in use today by the United States Marine 
Corps (USMC) are known as AN/GSQ-257 Unattended 
Ground Sensor Set. The AN/GSQ-257 devices are part of the 
USMC’s Tactical Remote Sensor System. The AN/GSQ-257s 
have multiple configurations that enable sensing of 
seismic/acoustic, magnetic, and/or infrared data [1]. This is 
helpful in performing perimeter enemy detection and tracking 
enemy movements offensively. The use of a WSN allows the 
USMC to remove the human element from possible danger 
while maintaining situational awareness with early detection 
from a remote location.  Since WSNs are low powered 
devices, a different type of communication protocol that 
maintains a low energy cost wireless environment needs to be 
used. The IEEE 802.15.4 standard is a physical and data link 
communication protocol for low power personal area networks 
(LoWPAN) and is widely used in embedded applications for 
real time data extraction.  
Since the IEEE 802.15.4 standard only defines the first two 
layers of the OSI model, another protocol must be used to 
provide full networking functionality for the WSN. The 
Internet Engineering Task Force’s (IETF) 6LoWPAN (IPv6 
over Low Power Wireless Personal Area Networks) is a 
protocol designed to work with the IEEE 802.15.4 standard. 
6LoWPAN is an open standard networking technology that 
standardizes Internet connectivity for low power wireless 
sensor networks. It alters the landscape by allowing IPv6 
packets to be carried efficiently within link layer frames, such 
as those defined by IEEE 802.15.4, while reducing IP 
overhead.  
A. Motives and Contributions 
As the use of WSNs grow in the Marine Corps, it will 
become more attractive to potential attackers. In order to 
prevent a passive or active attack, multiple security methods 
must be implemented to maintain an efficient and effective 
WSN. Comprehensive defense security mechanisms must 
account for multiple types of attacks. Generally, to defend 
against an attack the military develops a defense model for the 
attack. Since there are multiple types of attacks, the military 
has developed multiple models to defend against each one. The 
development of a single model to defend against a variety of 
attacks prevents the need for an expanded arsenal of defense 
models saving the military money and manpower. 
 The USMC has high interest in WSNs and their ability to 
connect to a public domain. Currently, their WSN devices are 
deployed into the field, and their base station, known as 
AN/MSC-77, contains working spaces for two individuals to 
work inside of it [2]. The AN/MSC-77 is also known as the 
Combat Operations Center (CoC). The CoC includes a 
dedicated power source or a large generator to provide the 
power necessary to run all of the equipment within the 
AN/MSC-77. The CoC unit must also be in the vicinity of the 
WSN devices unless a repeater is used to place the unit in a 
more remote location. Currently, in order for the USMC to 
obtain the data from the WSN, an individual must physically 
go to the CoC, as it does not transmit the data acquired from 
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the WSN. Thus, the current data flow from legacy equipment 
and sensor devices lacks automation. 
 To facilitate seamless data delivery to and from the sensor 
devices, the network should be connected to another secure 
domain using a comprehensive communication protocol. The 
use of 6LoWPAN would significantly change the information 
flow as it currently exists by allowing multiple users in a unit 
to access sensor information despite their location. IP based 
information can be easily used to inform the situational 
awareness and common operational picture of the engaged 
unit. 
 6LoWPAN has been extensively studied in the literature 
but the focus has mostly been on single hop networks and 
energy consumption [3]. There have been studies that take into 
consideration an approach to implementing an efficient 
security mechanism for 6LoWPAN by either performing an 
analysis or survey [4, 5]. Only a limited amount of research has 
been conducted implementing a proposed security framework 
over a multi-hop 6LoWPAN network [6]. 
 In this paper we propose a theoretical network design 
framework that uses 6LoWPAN and IEEE 802.15.4 such that it 
can be deployed for tactical operations by the Marine Corps. 
This theoretical framework is designed for a multi-hop static 
wireless sensor deployment scenario. Specifically, a command 
and control (administrative control) structure of the tactical 
WSN network is proposed. We incorporate and implement 
adjustments within the 6LoWPAN protocol packet structure 
that enables specific keying mechanisms and algorithms for 
confidentiality, authentication and integrity. Finally, the 
proposed steps in creating and deploying the secured tactical 
WSN will be examined. 
It must be noted that this is a work in progress. The 
theoretical framework to solve the above mentioned issues will 
be discussed in this paper. In the coming months we will be 
testing this framework to determine the design feasibility. The 
desired end state for this research is to provide security 
solutions for 6LoWPAN that would pair with and enable 
current commercial sensor technology to be employed in 
austere and/or hostile environments to support Marine Corps 
Operations in a secure and energy efficient manner. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In 
Section II we discuss the fundamentals of 6LoWPAN/IEEE 
802.15.4. Section III provides a comprehensive discussion on 
the theoretical tactical WSN framework, including network 
design and setup, 6LoWPAN packet structure and security 
mechanisms and planned simulation setup. We conclude the 
paper in Section IV. 
II.6LOWPAN/IEEE 802.15.4 FUNDAMENTALS 
There has been plenty of research to achieve security 
within a WSN [7]. There has been some work that has been 
done on tactical WSNs that serve as a foundation for our work 
[5, 6]. While [5] and [6] provide architectural constraints for 
tactical WSN deployment, the security mechanisms and its 
relationship with energy consumption is not discussed. In [8], 
the authors develop a cross layer load balancing/routing 
scheme for tactical WSNs. However, the routing mechanism 
does not provide for secure communications. 
In order to develop a feasible secure design for tactical 
WSNs using 6LoWPAN, it is necessary to understand its 
packet structure. Considering the packet is reduced to a size of 
127 bytes, some header information has been either removed 
or compressed. One of the fields within the header that was 
compressed was the addresses for the source and the 
destination. The address mode used reduces the IPv6 address 
from 128 bits (16 bytes) to 16 bits (2 bytes) which saves 14 
bytes per address saving a total of 28 bytes [9].  
Encryption within the 6LoWPAN environment is a 
requirement in order to have an effective tactical WSN and it 
has been addressed in the most recent release of the IEEE 
802.15.4 standard [10]. Along with encryption there is an 
ability to add a method to ensure authentication called a 
Message Integrity Code (MIC). Knowing how encryption 
methods operate helps determine which one to use to defend 
against a variety of attacks. Advanced Encryption Standard-
Counter with Cipher Block Chaining-Message Authentication 
Code (AES-CCM) is the suggested method within the 
6LoWPAN standard. Within the encryption method, an 
Initialization Vector (IV) is used. The combined fields within 
the IV provide a unique value to be used along with the 
encryption key, creating a unique encrypted payload for each 
packet transmitted.  
Another type of security mechanism is limiting the 
capabilities of the network. For instance, Network Discovery is 
a known vulnerability on 6LoWPAN networks [10]. Network 
Discovery is a method of finding neighboring nodes which the 
newly added node can route transmissions through. The 
vulnerability lies in verifying if the neighbor is a node that is 
authorized to access the WSN. A centralized, command and 
control tactical WSN architecture would mitigate some of these 
vulnerabilities.  
III.THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
In this section we discuss the theoretical framework for the 
design and implementation of the tactical WSN using 
6LoWPAN/IEEE 802.15.4. We discuss 1) the network design 
including the network devices used and their purpose; 2) the 
command and control parameters of the WSN which details 
specific tactical characteristics within the network (i.e., data 
routing and key management); and 3) the type of encryption 
used for the data is examined and determined.   
 
A. Network Design 
The proposed network design includes multiple elements, 
each serving a specific purpose. The elements included within 
the network architecture are as follows: master station (MS), 
base station/border router (BS), and sensor nodes. The 
proposed network architecture is shown in Fig. 1. 
Master Station (MS): The MS serves as the central node of 
the network, as depicted in Fig. 1. The proposed MS is a 
modified AN/MSC-77 (CoC) currently used by the USMC. 
The modifications increase the capabilities of the CoC by 
moving its location from the harsh environments where the 
WSN is deployed to a structured, fortified military base 
making it easier to protect and the data easily accessible. The 
proposed MS provides a universal connection to external 
domains, and accessibility and administrative privileges to the 
sensor nodes while located at a safe remote location away from 
the WSN. The MS has the ability to connect to each node 
within the internal domain since the WSN is able to 
communicate with each of the other individual elements. The 
MS also provides the user with a secure position to manage and 
control the WSN while obtaining the data from the WSN 
without having to rely on physically retrieving the stored data. 
Security for the MS has already been developed and tested 
throughout the military as it will not be operating within the 
network using 6LoWPAN. The MS will also be able to 
decipher the encrypted payloads sent to it from a 6LoWPAN 
device.  
Base Station/Border Router (BS/BR): The BS is the 
transitional element within the WSN that connects the 
6LoWPAN/internal environment to the public/external 
environment. This is also commonly known as a sink node. 
The proposed BS is essentially a secured router and transmits 
the data received from the WSN into an external domain to the 
MS. The BS receives packets from the nodes and removes 
unnecessary 6LoWPAN header information. It reassembles the 
payload into the external network packet structure in order to 
reach and be read by the MS. The BS also performs the same 
task in the reverse direction, removing unnecessary packet 
headers and adding the appropriate 6LoWPAN header to send 
the packet to the sensor nodes. Within the 6LoWPAN 
environment, the BS converts the addresses between the 
internal and external network environments since 6LoWPAN 
uses a modified addressing mode. The BS does not interfere 
with the payload because it is encrypted. The BS only contains 
the necessary encryption in order to connect to the MS, 
therefore the packet payload to be transmitted remains secure.  
The BS will be restricted to 63 hops from the furthest node 
since the hop limit field within the packet structure will only 
consist of 6 bits (this will be further discussed in Section III-
D). Since the BS connects the WSN to an external network, it 
will require either a dedicated electrical supply, a generator, or 
robust battery supply as more power is needed to transmit a 
signal strong enough to reach the external domain. Generally, 
each BS can be easily obtained at a lower cost than the total 
investment required to operate the AN/MSC-77 (CoC) in place 
near the WSN. The BS is also able to withstand the harsh 
environments in which it is deployed and is much smaller than 
the CoC since it does not need to have workstations available. 
The BS will also be tamper proof to prevent any physical 
modifications to the device as it is already implemented on the 
sensor devices in use [1]. Since the BS is smaller, it can also be 
concealed easier. 
Sensor Node: The sensor nodes are the end elements. Each 
node is designed to attach to multiple types of sensors and to 
relay packets to the MS for compilation and analysis. The 
nodes are tamper proof and are assumed to have the sensor 
capabilities as described in the USMC manual [1], including 
which sensors can be connected, and which modes of operation 
are offered. The sensor nodes communicate with the MS only 
through encrypted payloads. 
Attack Mitigation for Network Design: Vulnerabilities 
associated with the design of this tactical WSN include single 
points of failure and physical protection of the sensor nodes. 
The MS and BS are single points of failure to the WSN and if 
removed, the network is no longer accessible and unable to be 
used. A denial of service (DoS) attack would exploit this type 
of vulnerability. The MS has a greater impact on the WSN 
since it provides reachability, accessibility, and administrative 
privileges to the sensor nodes. The BS can be replaced by 
another BS without affecting the encryption or payload data 
transmission between the nodes and MS. The vulnerability of 
the MS and BS is not the focus of this paper but the military 
does have similar devices in place today. Lastly, the physical 
protection of the nodes and BS remains an accepted risk.  
B. Command and Control (Administrative Control) 
The administrative control aspects of the WSN are 
critically related to its functionality as well as the 
implementation of its security mechanisms. In this paper, the 
security mechanisms implemented are controlled by the MS. 
The control mechanisms of the MS include node control, 
defined routing, and keying mechanisms. Using a centralized 
entity, such as the MS, to perform these functions, limits 
attacks on the network.  
Node Control: The nodes will be controlled by the MS via 
encrypted payload. The encrypted payload will contain 
information which includes when the node will provide real 
time coverage or when the node will store detected events and 
transmit them in bulk at a later time [1].   This also removes the 
need to send an individual to the base station to make a 
modification or to place a new sensor required for a new task; 
instead the node can be adjusted immediately from the MS.  
Defined Routing: The MS will maintain a directory of all of 
the networks connected to the BS as well as the nodes within 
each network. The MS will also be able to control each node’s 
routing table. Each node will only be able to route to two nodes 
upstream (i.e., to the MS), with an exception for the nodes 
directly connected to the BS or when a node is deployed to a 
 
 
Fig. 1. Proposed 6LoWPAN network design 
location in which only one other node is within its wireless 
range. The node also performs in the same manner 
downstream, but the limitation of two nodes is not enforced in 
order to compensate for network expansion. This gives the MS 
the ability to implement energy cost saving measures within 
the network. Controlling the packet flow within the network is 
also a way to protect the network from outside attacks by not 
receiving and routing packets from invalid sources. 
The defined routing allows the MS to add new nodes by 
adding the new node’s address information into the 
neighboring node’s routing table via the encrypted payload and 
adding the necessary routing table information to the new node 
during the setup. This method prevents the need for a neighbor 
discovery protocol which is noted as a vulnerability within 
6LoWPAN in multiple sources [10, 11]. The MS can also 
remove compromised or expired nodes by removing the node 
from the neighboring nodes’ routing tables, thus any data sent 
from the node will not be routed.  
Fig. 2 is an example of the defined routing scheme of 
deployed sensors at an intersection. An intersection was used 
as an example since these devices track not only personnel but 
tanks or other manned vehicles [1]. The sensors are not limited 
to deployment at an intersection as they may also be deployed 
along a perimeter of a base or along a path of intended traffic. 
If an anomaly within the traffic flow occurs it may mean an 
impending attack or an attack by the enemy is already 
underway within the area. To provide full coverage of an 
intersection, sensors are placed on each side of the road. The 
primary and secondary routing paths are marked with every 
node having a secondary path except for the nodes with a direct 
link to the BS.  
 Fig. 3 demonstrates how the WSN is able to remove a node 
that has been compromised. The defined routing scheme is 
adjusted to not allow a packet to be transmitted to or from the 
compromised node since it is no longer in the routing tables 
within the WSN. The adjustments in the routing path did force 
some nodes to assume more of a load, but the WSN is able to 
remain effective until the compromised node is repaired. 
 Keying Mechanisms: A keying mechanism is needed in 
order to protect the information being transported between the 
nodes. Previous research from [10] determined that private 
keying is the most energy efficient method to transport the 
payload. With the use of a private key, each node will have a 
unique key which is only shared with the MS. As mentioned 
previously, the BS will not have any of the encryption keys 
shared between the nodes and the MS, but the BS will have a 
separate keying mechanism shared with the MS. The external 
network and the keying mechanism for the external network 
are already in use in other areas within the military and is not 
the focus of this paper. 
 Attack Mitigation for Administrative Control: Command 
and control allows for mitigating factors if the WSN has nodes 
that are attacked via man-in-the-middle (MITM) or DoS. Each 
of these attacks requires an individual or remote device to be 
near the WSN, but the attacker will be detected prior to 
performing the attack due to the sensor capabilities as 
previously mentioned above [1]. The defined routing prevents  
 
the intruder from further infecting and draining the rest of the 
network’s power resources. Use of a keying mechanism also 
protects the data during transportation over the network. 
Therefore the MITM or spoofing attacks will not be able to 
change any of the data nor will they be able to eavesdrop. 
C. Encryption 
Multiple types of encryption are available to us as keying 
mechanisms including the Advanced Encryption Standard 
(AES), Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), and Rivest-
Shamir-Adleman (RSA). Each encryption method is authorized 
by the National Security Agency (NSA) which sets the 
encryption standards for the Department of Defense and 
establishes key lengths set for the highest classification levels 
[12]. According to [10], the most recent IEEE 802.15.4 
standard lists eight security modes ranging from no encryption 
(one mode) to different versions of AES (seven modes). As a 
result, AES is used as the keying mechanism in this paper. The 
seven modes of AES boast different levels of encryption and 
authentication. Since the devices being used can be located 
within a hostile environment and are interacting with 
government networks, the highest levels of security are 
 
 
Fig. 2. Defined Routing Scheme 
 
 
Fig. 3. Defined Routing Scheme (with compromised node) 
required within the WSN; therefore, the data must be encrypted 
and authenticated. To meet these requirements AES-CCM* 
with 128 bit keys is used as the keying mechanism to provide 
confidentiality, integrity, and authentication. The selected 
encryption also protects against MITM, spoofing, and 
eavesdropping attacks. The keying mechanism will be further 
discussed in the 6LoWPAN packet structure. 
D.  6LoWPAN Packet Structure 
The proposed 6LoWPAN packet structure is shown in Fig. 
4 and is based on the packet structure defined in [13] with 
header compression schemes. However, the packet structure 
has been modified to incorporate the proposed security 
mechanisms. The fields within the packet structure are defined 
as follows:  
Frame Control (2 Bytes): This field has been defined by the 
802.15.4 standard with no changes made [14]. 
LOWPAN IPHC/LOWPAN NHC (2 Bytes Each): These 
fields have been defined by RFC 6282 [15] with no changes 
made. 
Path (2 Bits) /Hop Limit (6 Bits): The proposed routing 
mechanism defined in this paper limits the direction each 
packet can take to reach the BS from the node. This 
mechanism is a modification from the proposed packet 
structure in [13]. Within the “Path/Hop Limit” byte, the first 
two bits are used to help the MS determine if there is an issue 
with a node routing packets while the final six bits limit the 
amount of hops a packet can take to 26-1 or 63 hops. Limiting 
the number of hops to 63 will not present an issue since the 
node next to the BS would not be able to support a large 
network of nodes to remain energy efficient. The first two bits 
will be used individually to determine whether the packet was 
transmitted over a primary or secondary route. The second bit 
is used only by the source node. In the event the primary route 
is used to send the packet, the bit is 0. If the secondary route is 
used then the bit is 1. The same method is applied to the first 
bit and is used by all nodes except the originating node. When 
the MS receives the packet, it is known if a node was not able 
to transmit to a designated primary node. Depending on the 
modes of operation selected, the MS may be able to determine 
which node may be off line or compromised instead of waiting 
for a response or detection. Specific attacks such as wormhole, 
sinkhole, black hole, and sybill attacks can be detected or even 
prevented by the designated routing and path bits. 
Source/Destination Address (2 Bytes Each): The addresses 
are in the compressed 16 bit mode for a smaller overhead 
described within [15]. 
 Initialization Vector (16 Bytes): The IV is used to help 
protect against replay attacks and is also used in the CCM* 
process to encrypt the payload [10]. The shaded area within Fig 
4 is the proposed composition of the IV. 
 Source Port/Destination Port/CRC (2 Bytes Each) and 
Length of IP Header (1 Byte): These four fields have no 
changes or compression modifications [15]. 
Payload (71 Bytes): The payload is the amount of data that 
can actually be transmitted from the WSN. The data is 
encrypted, providing confidentiality during data transmission 
using the combination of the IV and the AES-CCM* 128 bit 
key.  
Message Integrity Code (16 Bytes): To provide 
authentication and integrity, a MIC is created within the AES-
CCM* mode of encryption and is attached to the end of the 
packet. The MIC is a hash unique to the packet and is used to 
verify that no changes were made to the original message. The 
MIC provides another layer of protection against any attack 
that tries to inject or change data being transmitted.  
 Next Header (1 Byte): It is used in higher layers and 
remains unchanged [15]. 
E. Transition 
The transition of the packet from one domain to the other is 
to be completed by the BS as previously mentioned above. 
Since the 6LoWPAN packet contains necessary information 
for the MS to properly assess the effectiveness and efficiency 
of the WSN, the BS must transfer the necessary fields to the 
packet used on the external domain. Fields needed by the MS 
include the Path, IV, Payload, Next Header, and MIC. The 
designated Path bits are only required to make the transition 
when the message is coming from the node to the MS as the 
node cannot perform control commands and is not equipped to 
handle the analysis of paths taken by multiple nodes.   
F. Deployment of Nodes 
The deployment of the WSN will be similar to Fig.1. 
Creating the network first requires setup of the key exchange 
for encryption purposes, the routing table to be loaded, and 
evaluation of ideal physical placements for the nodes.  
Key Exchange/Routing Table: After the network is 
designed and all of the routing tables have been constructed, 
the information for each node needs to be transferred to the 
node and BS. Each node and BS is physically connected to the 
MS for bootstrapping. The private key for the device and the 
constructed routing table is transferred to the node and BS. The 
routing table is transferred to the nodes by the MS to enable the 
nodes to connect to the network. The key exchange consists of 
a private key which is only shared between the MS and the 
node. The physical transfer of the key exists to prevent an 
enemy from gaining access to an entire network’s information 
(MITM attack) simply by obtaining the key from one node. By 
using a private key unique to each node the enemy would only 
have access to that node’s information. It will also allow the 
MS to remove the node from the network by adjusting routing 
 Bytes 1 2 3 4
LOWPAN IPHC (2 Bytes ) Path/Hop Limit
Flags Sequence Number
Source Port
Source Port Length of IP Header
Next Header
Source MAC Address (8 Bytes)
Dest MAC (8 Bytes)











Fig. 4. Proposed 6LoWPAN Packet Structure 
tables of surrounding nodes without compromising the rest of 
the network.  
Physical Placement: While connected, the MS is able to 
maintain a geographical map of deployed nodes and map the 
deployment of any new node. This will help determine if the 
pending placement of the new node will be able to connect to 
surrounding nodes. This is critical to the deployment of the 
WSN since it will help track enemy movements and position.  
Network Connection: Since the physical location of the 
node will be known and the surrounding nodes will be within 
reach, the placement within the network will also be 
determined. The MS can then add the node to the desired 
network. If the node is able to be added to multiple networks, 
then the MS is able to determine which network would be the 
most energy efficient network to add the node.  
G. Simulation 
We intend to test and evaluate the proposed theoretical 
framework in the coming months. The proposed WSN with the 
modified 6LoWPAN packet structure will be implemented and 
tested against a variety of attacks within a MATLAB simulated 
environment. The attacks that will be used are: MITM, 
spoofing, and a node focused DoS attack. The MITM attack 
will be focused on eavesdropping and changing the data as the 
packet is transmitted. This will help determine if the MS can 
detect whether the data was changed. Spoofing will focus on 
authentication and the simulation will confirm that the MS will 
notice the data received is not valid which will result in the 
removal of the node from the WSN. A node focused DoS 
attack will cause a node to fail and the simulation will confirm 
that the MS can detect the loss of the node, again leading to the 
node’s removal from the WSN.  
The attacks will be focused strictly on a network 
environment and will not provide any indications or warnings 
prior to being implemented. The purpose of the simulations is 
to determine if the attacks are defended against and detected, 
allowing for mitigations to take place, not to actually perform  
the mitigations.  
IV.CONCLUSION  
In this paper, we study the implementation of the 
6LoWPAN protocol for tactical WSNs. We examine the need 
for 6LoWPAN in tactical WSNs used by the Marine Corps in 
operational scenarios. The 6LoWPAN protocol with the 
addition of necessary security mechanisms can be implemented 
and used by the USMC to boost the abilities of their current 
WSNs. In this paper, we develop and discuss a comprehensive 
tactical WSN framework using 6LoWPAN that includes a 
hierarchical network design using defined network devices. 
The use of a structured/centralized network design allows for 
secure network reachability and accessibility. We implement 
multiple security mechanisms within the 6LoWPAN protocol. 
These security features include encryption, authentication and 
integrity and are applied/implemented into the 6LoWPAN 
packet structure. We intend to evaluate our framework using 
MATLAB and test it against a variety of attacks in the coming 
months. 
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